

The Use of Bowties to Aid the Management of Risk in the Mining Industries

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
- Independent and specialist **risk management** consulting and training provider
- Part of the TÜV Rheinland Group
- We help clients to manage health, safety, security, environmental (HSSE) and business risk in sectors where the impact of loss is high
- **250+** employees across **14** offices worldwide
- **50+** FTE associates embedded in client organisations
- ...working in **7** diverse market sectors
- ...delivered over **5,500** projects to over **1,200** clients in over **75** countries
- ...providing practical solutions (**no two assignments are the same!**)

TÜV Rheinland

- 20,000 people in 500 locations in 65 countries
- World leading independent provider of technical services for testing, inspection, certification, consulting and training to the industrial, transportation and healthcare sectors



Our consulting services



RISK ENGINEERING

- Hazard Identification
- Physical Effects Consequence Modelling
- Qualitative Risk Assessment
- Bowtie Risk Management
- Quantitative Risk Assessment
- Functional Safety
- ALARP Assessment
- Availability, Reliability & Maintainability



RISK MANAGEMENT

- Asset Integrity Management
- Process Safety Management
- HSSE Management Systems
- HSSE/ Safety Cases
- Independent Review & Auditing
- Incident Investigation
- Emergency Planning & Crisis Management
- Business Continuity Management
- Security Risk Management



CULTURE & BEHAVIOUR

- Safety Leadership
- Cultural & Behavioural Improvement
- Human Factors
- Competency Management
- Workplace Safety
- Training & Education
 - MSc
 - RPQ
 - In-house & public training

Products (reseller) – BowTieXP, Investigator-3

TÜV Rheinland provides a broad range of testing, inspection, certification and training services, significantly extending the services offered to our clients

The Mines Regulations 2014

Regulation 7 – General Duties of the Mine Operator


1) The mine operator must take the necessary measures to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the mine and its equipment are designed, constructed, equipped, commissioned, operated and maintained in such a way that persons at work can perform the work assigned to them without endangering their own health and safety or the health and safety of others.

22 The mine operator should employ a risk management approach to identify the measures which are required to secure workers' health and safety. A typical risk management system would usually include the following elements:

- (a) identifying the hazards;
- (b) quantifying the risks;
- (c) examining the control options available and their merits, including the human factor aspects, and setting appropriate control measures;
- (d) implementing the control measures;
- (e) monitoring the effectiveness of the control measures and revising where necessary.

26 The mine operator and all those in the management structure should appreciate the difference between major hazard risk SPIs and those relating to non-major hazard risks. Commonly used measures of safety performance such as accident, ill-health or incident statistics (lagging indicators) are not reliable indicators of how well the measures to prevent major hazard incidents are working.

Risk management process



Ref. ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines

Risk management

✓ Is this tolerable?
? Can we do anything more?

IDENTIFY

Are people, environment, assets or reputation exposed to potential harm?
What could go wrong?

ASSESS

What are the causes and consequences?
How likely is it?
How bad will it be?
What is the risk and is it ALARP?

CONTROL

Can the causes be eliminated?
Is there a better way?
How can it be prevented?
How effective are the controls?

RECOVER

Can the potential consequences be limited?
What mitigation measures are needed?
Are recovery capabilities suitable and sufficient?

Where do Bowties fit in?

Table 4.3: Characteristic Hazards for EOP Events

Event	Hazard	Consequence
1.1.1.1	Loss of power	Loss of control
1.1.1.2	Loss of communication	Loss of control
1.1.1.3	Loss of instrumentation	Loss of control
1.1.1.4	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.5	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.6	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.7	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.8	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.9	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.10	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.11	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.12	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.13	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.14	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.15	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.16	Loss of control	Loss of control
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1.1.1.25	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.26	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.27	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.28	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.29	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.30	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.31	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.32	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.33	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.34	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.35	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.36	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.37	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.38	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.39	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.40	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.41	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.42	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.43	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.44	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.45	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.46	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.47	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.48	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.49	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.50	Loss of control	Loss of control

Identify Hazards

Risk Management


Table 4.5: Hazards and Effects Register

HAZARD ID	HAZARD SOURCE	THREAT (CONSEQUENCE)	TOP EVENT	CONSEQUENCE	RISK RATING	CONTROL	COMMENTS
1.1.1.1	Loss of power	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of power	Loss of control
1.1.1.2	Loss of communication	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of communication	Loss of control
1.1.1.3	Loss of instrumentation	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of instrumentation	Loss of control
1.1.1.4	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.5	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.6	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.7	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.8	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
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1.1.1.39	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.40	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.41	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.42	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.43	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.44	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.45	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.46	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.47	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.48	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.49	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control
1.1.1.50	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	Loss of control	High	Loss of control	Loss of control

Develop Risk Scenario

Severity	CONSEQUENCE					FREQUENCY				
	People	Assets	Environment	Reputation		A	B	C	D	E
0	No injury	No damage	No effect	No impact		Never heard of in the industry	Has occurred in industry	Has occurred in company	Occurs several times per year in company	Occurs several times per year at location
1	Slight injury	Slight damage	Slight effect	Slight impact	Manage for continuous improvement					
2	Minor injury	Minor damage	Minor effect	Limited impact						
3	Major injury	Localised damage	Localised effect	Considerable impact	Incorporate risk reduction measures					
4	1 - 3 fatalities	Major damage	Major effect	National impact						
5	Multiple fatalities	Extensive damage	Massive effect	International impact	Intolerable					

Assess Risk



Detailed Analysis of Significant Risks


Usually, but not always. Establish the objective of the bowties before you start

Bowtie Methodology

A short History...

- Exact origins of bow-tie methodology are hazy – believed to originate from ICI in the late 1970's
- Royal Dutch/Shell Group first major company to integrate bow-ties fully into business practices
- Use of bow-ties now widely spread between companies, industries, countries and from industry to regulator, e.g.:
 - UK Health and Safety Executive
 - Civil Aviation Authority
 - French Government
 - Australian State Regulator
 - Land Transport Safety Authority of New Zealand
 - International standards (e.g. ISO 17776:2000)
 - International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC)

Basic bowtie structure




This — *leads to* —> **This** — *leads to* —> **That**

Building the Bowtie Diagram

Prevention


Mitigation



General Guidance


- Threats must be capable of releasing the hazard
 - Failed barriers aren't threats
- Barriers should be:
 - Prevention - can, by themselves, prevent the threat causing the top event
 - Mitigation - mitigate the consequences of a top event once it has occurred
 - Relevant to the threat or consequence
- Active barriers should include elements of:
 - detection, problem solving and action
- All barriers should be:
 - clearly defined and consistent
 - independent
 - measurable
 - relatively effective
- Escalation Factors compromise the effectiveness of barriers

How are controls made effective?



Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation
Prof. James Reason

How controls are made effective in bowties



Performance standards

A Performance Standard describes how a SCE must perform in terms of its functionality, availability, reliability and survivability, and also any interdependence with other SCEs

- Provide assurance that SCEs are, and remain **suitable** for, their intended purpose (FARSI)
- Focus on engineering statements that define a specific **inspection, testing or maintenance** requirement
- Provide sufficient detail to enable realistic monitoring and analysis of **actual performance** based on Computerised Maintenance Management System (CMMS) records


Critical activities: typical information

- **WHO does the activities?**
 - aim to set activities that may be verified at supervisor level
- **WHAT do they do?**
 - brief description of activity
 - how does the person know what to do?
- **WHY is the activity done?**
 - what prompts the activity?
 - how does the person know when to do it?
- **HOW do we know it's been done?**
 - what assures us that the activity was performed correctly?



Create ownership of the barriers



Example Bowtie



ALARP Process Summary



Barrier Rating	Used?	Does it work/ is it effective?
Very Good	Always	Always (>99%)
Good	Frequently	Generally (75% - 99%)
Unknown	Unknown/not guaranteed	Unknown/cannot be guaranteed (50% - 75%)
Poor	Occasionally	Possibly (25% - 50%)
Very Poor	Rarely	Currently ineffective (<25%)
Un-assessed	-	Insufficient information



	Low	Medium	High
Consider	Consider	Consider, if risk high	Do not implement
Implement	Implement	Consider	Consider, if risk high
Implement	Implement	Implement	Consider

Develop the Bowtie

Identify and question the barriers

How good are the barriers?

Could we do more?

Is it reasonably practicable?

Implement in good time

Document the process

- Plant
- People
- Procedures

- Are there enough?
- Of the right quality?

- Improve existing?
- Add more?


- Monitor/Audit
- Review

Through Life Assurance

Performance Monitoring

LAGGING INDICATORS




Measure barrier defects (holes), events and consequences



LEADING INDICATORS

Measure barrier strength (activities which maintain risk control systems)

Audit



Bowtie Method

Advantages

- Graphical format encourages
 - Participation
 - Ownership
 - Use
 - Understanding
- Clear identification of roles and responsibilities
- Can vary level of detail specific to the analysis

Pitfalls

- Can be difficult to do well
- Need to ensure:
 - Consistency of approach
 - Pitching at the right level
 - Involving the right people
 - Avoiding wish fulfilment
- Control dependencies
- Doesn't replace QRA

Summary

- The better we understand, the better we manage
 - Reactively, for what we have
 - Proactively, for audit and review
- What is really there, rather than what we wish is there
- Bowties are a user-friendly, graphical illustration of how hazards are controlled, supporting a complete and comprehensive approach to risk management
 - Linkage to HSE Management Systems;
 - Assigning Critical Tasks, Procedures, Competencies
 - Identifying Safety Critical Equipment, Processes
- Not only what controls are in place today, but why they will still be there tomorrow.

Thank you

Any questions?

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