






Today's session

- Bowties are easy to understand but a quality bowtie is deceptively difficult to build. But does one set of "rules" for building bowties work for all applications?
- This session will examine different approaches for different applications, e.g. using bowties for LOPA reviews, Safety Case demonstrations, management control reviews, simple pictorial communication, etc.
- It will explore both the commonalities and differences in the "rules", as well as giving delegates an opportunity to bring along their own bowties and issues for discussion.



The problem






Basics

- Why are you doing it/ What do you want to find out?/What does the client want?
- How to record?
 - Flip chart/white board
 - Post it notes
 - Word/Excel/PowerPoint
 - Bowtie software
- How much detail?
 - Basic bowtie
 - Effectiveness
 - Tasks
 - Elements
 - Documents
 - SIL ratings
 - Others?



Basic

To allow a rapid review of the issues e.g. concept design






Pictorial





Design/ Safety Case


- To show additional information e.g.
 - Tasks
 - Effectiveness
 - Critical elements






Documents

Hot linked documents as a training aid





Management Systems








LOPA

To calculate sequence frequencies



Frequency of consequence C1 from threat T1 = $IEF(T1) \times P(EF) \times PFD(B1) \times PFD(B2) \times PFD(B3) \times PFD(R1) \times PFD(R2) \times PFD(R3) \times P$



Rules

- To achieve consistency
- Set basic expectations
- Must be fit for purpose(s)
- Must be communicated
- May cover e.g.
 - Approach
 - Attendees
 - Acceptance criteria
 - Effectiveness ratings/scorings



Rigid Rules

"There shall be three barriers between a threat and the top event"

- For all frequencies of threat?
- Is inspection a separate barrier to maintenance?

"Barriers shall be fully functional to stop the consequence from occurring"

- Is a gas detection system fully functional?
- What about the emergency response plan?

"A single barrier can function as either a prevention or mitigation barrier but not both"

- What about a tank farm bund?
 - Prevents access and impacts
 - Limits extent of spills




Potential Problem Areas

- Barrier independence
- Use of escalation factors
- Effectiveness and Acceptability
- Level of detail
- Human error



Dependency

If controls are dependent, there is less defense




- What counts as dependency?
 - Same person?
 - Same systems?
 - Common services?
- Separate bowtie for common areas?



Use of Escalation Factors

- Adds local failure cases
- Can get very repetitive
- Use for barrier general failures?





Effectiveness and Acceptability

- Gut feel
- 1 to 3, 1 to 5
- Numerical
- SIL

Effectiveness	Source	Criteria		
Effective	Field Experience	Hardware: Inspections/tests conducted as per Performance Standard; Functions properly when tested Processes: Audits conducted, corrective actions resolved or planned Personnel: HSE training up-to-date, Personal Job Profile accurate; Competence assured; Contractor HSEMS meets standards		
2000000	Internal or Asset Integrity Audit	No or Low audit finding		
	Incident Investigation	Control is in place		
Partially Effective	Field Experience	Hardware: Inspections/tests conducted but hardware needs frequent adjustment to pass function test; some backlog of preventive maintenance activities that could impair performance Processes: Not applied consistently but still considered functional by each crew Personnel: HSE training only partially up-to-date, all Personal Job Profile not completed; Contractor HSEMS has some deficiencies		
	Internal or Asset Integrity Audit	Medium audit finding		
	Incident Investigation	Investigation determines Human Element is at fault		
	Field Experience	Control is Missing, Failed, or does not meet mandatory aspects of performance standard.		
Ineffective	Internal or Asset Integrity Audit	High or Serious audit finding		
	Incident Investigation	Control found to be Missing or Failed		

Rating	Is it used? Is it in place?	Does it work/is it effective/human dependency?	Bowtie code
Very Reliable	Always	Control has more than a 99.5 % of working when required, no human involvement	
Reliable	Frequently	Control has a > 90 % chance of working when required, little human involvement	
Fairly Reliable	Mainly	Control has a < 90 % > 60 % chance of working when required, active human involvement	
Unreliable	Occasionally	Control has a < 60 % > 30 % chance of working when required, very active human involvement, complex and stressful to operate	
Very Unreliable	Rarely	Control has less than a 30 % chance of working when required, continuous human involvement, very complex	
	-	Additional risk reduction measure (as part of ALARP demonstration)	

		Barrier Operating Effectiveness Level				
		Industry best practice / world class	Industry standard	Minor degradation	Major degradation	
Barrier Design Effectiveness Level	Industry best practice / world class	6	5	4	3	
	Industry standard	5	4	3	2	
	Sub-standard	4	3	2	1	
	Ineffective or unknown	3	2	1	0	



Level of Detail

Dropped

Object Impact

To represent as a threat or a separate bowtie?

All lifting

operations near

inventories require detailed risk assessment to identify

controls


Integrity of

lifting equipment

Competency of

crane operator


and rigging crew






Representing Human Error

Explicit claims on operator actions




Using Tasks




3.3.1	Maintenance and Perform maintenance, testing and calibration of critical rig instrumentation	Manufacturer's Instructions	Completed	maintenance	
3.3.1	testing of critical systems (including hand held/portable systems) and all associated		records	mannechanee	
	instrumentation equipment and protective systems in accordance with Noble maintenance	- SA WORKSTOE	records		
	procedures. Includes				
	- drilling system instrumentation e.g. level indicators, pressure gauges,				
	string weight indicators, zone management system etc.				
	- marine systems e.g. navigation, radar, consoles and control stations,				
	current monitors, anemometers				
	- watertight door indicators, bilge sensors				
	- crane boom angle and weight indicators				
	- crane AOPS and MOPS systems				
	- gantry crane photo-cell and motion alarms				
	- bulk storage system level gauges and alarms				
	- fire, smoke and heat detectors and fire&gas panel alarms				
	- Emergency Shutdown systems			A	
	- communications systems, including PA/GA				TÜV Rheinla
	- CCTV				
	- UPS systems				Risktec

Human Error Threat






Human Error Bowtie





Human Factors Assessment



Summary

- What do you actually want to achieve?
- Rules to guide rather than mandate
- Start simple, but ask questions to aid level of detail



Thank you for your attention

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